Se examina el significado de los conceptos de “doctrina” y “tradición” en las reflexiones de W. Benjamin hacia 1917, íntimamente vinculados con su recepción de Kant. Los escasos análisis de tal recepción relegan este aspecto. Se intenta mostrar que estos conceptos expresan un interés por la idea kantiana de unidad sistemática del conocimiento, y que Benjamin reinterpreta tal unidad en términos mesiánicos: ya no como un supuesto necesario, sino como una exigencia de redención. Finalmente, se muestra cómo modo (...) estas nociones se hallan implícitas en el escrito “Sobre el programa de una filosofía futura”. (shrink)

Este trabajo muestra una concurrencia patente en la resonancia de las categorías ‘industria cultural’ [Kulturindustrie] –empleada por Theodor Adorno para indicar ciertas zonas de la dialéctica subjetiva– e ‘industria de recreo’ [Vergnügungsindustrie] –referida por Walter Benjamin en relación a la dialéctica objetiva–. Me detengo en esta poco explorada concomitancia para determinar por qué Adorno evidencia una dialéctica de la subjetividad administrada en la renuncia sacrificial y Benjamin elabora una dialéctica de la objetividad fetichizada signada por su carácter de (...) fantasmagoría cadavérica. Así, señalo una dimensión de la incardinación entre la veta expansiva de la racionalidad moderna y la instrumentalización de sujetos y objetos. (shrink)

Paul de Man ha interpretado la teoría de la traducción de Walter Benjamín como precursora de las posiciones de la deconstrucción. Por el contrario, aquí se va a demostrar la centralidad del mesianismo en la teoría del lenguaje y de la traducción de Benjamín, así como en su posterior concepción materialista de la historia. Se va a mantener que la fuerza teórica del pensamiento de este autor tiene como base precisamente tal elemento teológico.

Se suele afirmar, y con razón, que la representación de la historia en el pensamiento de Walter Benjamin es esencialmente antiteleológica. Pese a esto, en sus escritos se encuentran dos importantes menciones del término “teleología” que permiten pensar en un uso excepcional de este concepto: la “teleología sin fin final” y el “momento teleológico del despertar”. En el presente artículo examinaremos de qué modo estas pistas casi recónditas sobre la teleología repercuten de lleno en la concepción de la historia (...) de Benjamin, rebatiendo aquella interpretación de su pensamiento, según la cual, la teleología habría sido completamente rechazada de su filosofía. (shrink)

Desde finales del siglo XX, las investigaciones sobre modernidad, orientadas hacia distintos segmentos del campo cultural, han venido ganando un enorme terreno. Las obras de Walter Benjamin, leídas en esta perspectiva, cobran un gran valor. Se busca explorar cuatro temas benjaminianos: a) algunos aspectos de su concepto de historia; b) el concepto de experiencia, para mostrar su dimensión histórico-crítica con respecto al ascenso de la cultura moderna; c) las afinidades entre el modo en que se desarrolla la visión alegórica (...) en el drama barroco alemán y el modo en que Baudelaire afronta las problemáticas de la modernidad; d) elementos de algunas formas culturales del arte moderno que entusiasman a Benjamin. (shrink)

Desde el siglo XIX, un estado de alerta permanente frente al terrorismo en las democracias liberales modernas ha permitido la coexistencia de una aparente normalidad socio-jurídica y el estado de excepción, el espacio en el que el derecho se suspende a sí mismo para protegerse de una amenaza a su poder. Los actuales medios de policía y espionaje propios de la guerra moderna antiterrorista sirven para poner a prueba la hipótesis benjaminiana de que el Estado debe acudir siempre a una (...) instancia superior de autoridad y legalidad ante la imposibilidad de defender su orden en el marco mismo de la ley. Este artículo analiza en profundidad los conceptos de “violencia” y “excepción” en Benjamin a partir de las reflexiones sobre la pena de muerte y policía de Estado desarrolladas en su ensayo “Para una crítica de la violencia”, puestas en diálogo con las ideas de autores como Beccaria, Schmitt, Agamben y Honneth. (shrink)

Tras la lectura de esta obra, reconocemos que su autora, Stephanie Graf, mantiene una signatura o estilo constante en cada parte, capítulo y subtítulo, pues le interesa plantear una trama, un tablero para dialogar con el trabajo de Walter Benjamin y de Theodor W. Adorno, ante uno de los desafíos más urgentes de nuestro tiempo: ¿Cómo entender la supervivencia de la teología en un mundo secular? En específico, ¿de qué forma el escándalo del mal, sobre todo del mal excesivo (...) en Auschwitz, nos remite inevitablemente a la metafísica, a la creación, la revelación, la redención, aun cuando estos pensadores judíos se ubican en el campo del materialismo histórico y la sola responsabilidad humana? De ahí el llamado a la inversión. (shrink)

El presente artículo analiza la cuestión del materialismo y su relación con el arte en el pensamiento de Walter Benjamin. Es una cuestión harto controvertida en los debates sobre Benjamin, y el artículo estudia minuciosamente sus dos textos fundamentales que abordan la cuestión: El autor como productor y La obra de arte en la era de su reproductibilidad técnica. Antes de ello, se enmarca el problema en el contexto de la época y, en especial, en la relación de (...) Benjamin con Brecht, que fue tomado como uno de los elementos clave para entender el giro materialista del primero. Este hecho perturbó algunos de los colegas como Adorno, Horkheimer y Karplus, que veían a Brecht como un materialista excesivamente ortodoxo. El artículo defiende que si bien Benjamin giró hacia posiciones materialistas a lo largo de la década de los 30, ese materialismo no era como la de la ortodoxia marxista de la época, aunque, efectivamente, fue más allá de los planteamientos modernistas de Adorno. (shrink)

The link between force, violence and events in the philosophy of Jacques Derrida is explored, arguing that this relationship is at the very heart of the problem of meaning and its performativity. This thesis is based on the analysis of Derrida’s reading of both Benjamin’s Critique of Violence, as well as Austin’s linguistic performative theory, which allows, at first, to link the question of signification with that of force or violence. Subsequently, we use the analysis of W. Hamacher about (...) Benjamin in order to strengthen that connection and propose a new reading of the question of the event in Derrida. We obtain a philosophy of the event that moves between ethics, politics and linguistics that allows new approaches to the “critique” of violence. (shrink)

Se trata de unareflexión interdisciplinar, a partir de W. Benjamin, sobre las relaciones entre experiencia, tiempo y memoriahistórica. La 1. parte analiza el empobrecimiento moderno de la Erfahrung que genera una“nueva barbarie”, a la vez que expenmentación innovadora, y que reclama un concepto más rico de experiencia, ligada ala totalidad concrete de la existencia. La 2. señala algunas paradojas de la memoria, muestra la inconsistencia del tiempo, cristalizado en el mito de Cronos, comoprincipio ordenador, y toma en consideración experiencias (...) relevantes que requieren concebir otro tiempo. En esa dirección, la 3. parte desarrolla la idea de Jetztze¡t, nucleo de la concepción crítica de la historia como tradición de los oprimidos, en cuyos bistantes de peligro relanipagea el angelus novus.Il s’agit d’une reflexion interdisciplinaire sur les liaisons entre expérience, temps et bistoire. La lére partie analyse l’appauvrissement moderne de l’Erfahrung, qui produit, selon W. Benjaniin, experimentation créatice et á la fois “une nouvelle barbarie”, et qui exige la construction d’un concept plus tiche d’expérience, liée á la totalité concréte de l’existence. La 2&me ¡nontre quelques paradoxes de la mémoire, sovligne ]‘inconsistance dv lemps comino principe d’ordre, et rappelle l’existence d’expériences qui demandent un autre concept du temps. La 3éme partie developpe ¡‘idee benjaininienne de Jetztzeit, noyau de sa conception critique de l’histoire conune tradition des opprimés, et analyse particuliérement la figure de l’angelus novus. (shrink)

En este trabajo se pretende hacer una pequeña correlación, a manera de homenaje, entre el pensamiento de Theodor W. Adorno y el de su amado maestro, Walter Benjamin. Los vínculos que unen a ambos pensadores, pueden encontrarse en el peso de las palabras que comparten, en medio de un contexto propio de la crítica filosófica alemana y de las raíces judaicas que los unen. Bajo la figura alegórica del ángel de la historia, se tejen nexos entre una selección de (...) citas tomadas de la Dialéctica negativa de Th. W. Adorno y de algunos conceptos expuestos en El origen del drama barroco alemán de W. Benjamin. (shrink)

W. Benjamin expresa su inquietud política en las tesis acerca de la “violencia revolucionaria” como “excepción divina”, valorada por J. Derrida como una ruptura histórica; esto permite ver una analogía e incluso una continuidad en estos autores. Sin embargo, Derrida subraya la inadecuación política y el efecto “insoportable” del planteamiento de Benjamin. Se intenta comprender el fondo de esta crítica y avanzar hacia una hipótesis que haga converger las dos problematizaciones de la violencia y las complemente con el (...) tema mesiánico y el problema de la responsabilidad. (shrink)

This paper offers an analysis of the nature of epistemic trust. With increased philosophical attention to social epistemology in general and testimony in particular, the role for an epistemic or intellectual version of trust has loomed large in recent debates. But, too often, epistemologists talk about trust without really providing a sustained examination of the concept. After some introductory comments, I begin by addressing various components key to trust simpliciter. In particular, I examine what we might think of when we (...) consider what it means to place trust in someone. Once we have examined trust in general, we can modify this discussion to derive an epistemic version of trust—placing trust in someone for an epistemic reason. I argue that ET includes four components: belief, communication, reliance, and confidence. The first two sets are distinctively epistemic and the second set of conditions form the core of any kind of trust. Put together,.. (shrink)

I have taken an experimental approach to this question. Freely voluntary acts are preceded by a specific electrical change in the brain that begins 550 ms before the act. Human subjects became aware of intention to act 350-400 ms after RP starts, but 200 ms. before the motor act. The volitional process is therefore initiated unconsciously. But the conscious function could still control the outcome; it can veto the act. Free will is therefore not excluded. These findings put constraints on (...) views of how free will may operate; it would not initiate a voluntary act but it could control performance of the act. The findings also affect views of guilt and responsibility. But the deeper question still remains: Are freely voluntary acts subject to macro-deterministic laws or can they appear without such constraints, non-determined by natural laws and ‘truly free'? I shall present an experimentalist view about these fundamental philosophical opposites. (shrink)

I have taken an experimental approach to this question. Freely voluntary acts are preceded by a specific electrical change in the brain that begins 550 ms before the act. Human subjects became aware of intention to act 350-400 ms after RP starts, but 200 ms. before the motor act. The volitional process is therefore initiated unconsciously. But the conscious function could still control the outcome; it can veto the act. Free will is therefore not excluded. These findings put constraints on (...) views of how free will may operate; it would not initiate a voluntary act but it could control performance of the act. The findings also affect views of guilt and responsibility. But the deeper question still remains: Are freely voluntary acts subject to macro-deterministic laws or can they appear without such constraints, non-determined by natural laws and ‘truly free'? I shall present an experimentalist view about these fundamental philosophical opposites. (shrink)

The paper begins by contrasting the unitary nature of conscious experience with the demonstrable localization of neural events. Philosophers and neuroscientists have developed models to account for this paradox, but they have yet to be tested empirically. The author proposes a `Conscious Mental Field', which is produced by, but is phenomenologically distinct from, brain activity. The hypothesis is, in principle, open to experimental verification. The paper suggests appropriate surgical procedures and some of the difficulties that would need to be overcome (...) in such an experiment. (shrink)

Behav. and Brain Sci., 8, 558-566. Libet, B. (1987). 'Consciousness: Conscious, Subjective Experience.' In Encyclopedia of Neuroscience , ed. G. Adelman. ...

This paper begins with the oft-repeated claim that having faith involves trust in God. Taking this platitude seriously requires at least two philosophical tasks. First, one must address the relevant notion of “trust” guiding the platitude. I offer a sketch of epistemic trust: arguing that epistemic trust involves several components: acceptance, communication, dependence, and confidence. The first duo concerns the epistemic element of epistemic trust and the second part delimit the fiducial aspect to epistemic trust. Second, one must also examine (...) what differentiates faith qua trust. I argue that we should not distinguish faith from trust merely by believing religious propositions but by the attitudes they express. In particular, the attitude of faith is more deeply entrenched and central to one’s noetic structure than trust simpliciter. The paper ends by arguing that the account proposed insofar as it accommodates and explains certain “faith desiderata”. We can thus give content to the “faith is a kind of trust” platitude with a model of trust on hand while showing how that model confirms and explains important features of faith. (shrink)

More than ever, it is in vogue to argue that no norms either play a role in or directly follow from the theory of mental content. In this paper, I present an intuitive theory of intentionality (including a theory of mental content) on which norms are constitutive of the intentional properties of attitude and content in order to show that this trend is misguided. Although this theory of intentionality—the teleological theory of intentional representation—does involve a commitment to representational norms, these (...) norms are not problematic in the way critics have suggested they would be. In particular, these norms do not guide thinking by motivating intentional agents to (intentionally) accord with them; as a result, no obvious vicious regress threatens the theory. In the final section of this paper, I argue that accepting this teleological theory of intentionality need not commit one to thinking that intentionality is the product of natural selection. (shrink)

Una lectura de la "Erkenntnis-kritische Vorrede" a Ursprung des deutsches Trauerspiels busca determinar en qué sentido Benjamin efectúa, en la teoría de las ideas allí esbozada, lo que él mismo llamó después una "tranposicion" del concepto goetheano de Urphänomen. El cotejo con algunos de los naturw..

Commentary on John Searle's Article John Searle presents a philosopher's view of how conscious experience and free action relate to brain function. That view demands an examination by a neuroscientist who has experimentally investigated this issue.

The chief goal of Velmans' article is to find a way to solve the problem of how conscious experience could have bodily effects. I shall discuss his treatment of this below. First, I would like to deal with Velmans' treatment of my own studies of volition and free will in relation to brain processes. Unconscious Initiation and Conscious Veto of Freely Voluntary Acts Velmans appropriately refers to our experimental study that found that onset of an electrically observable cerebral process preceded (...) the appearance of the subject's awareness of the conscious wish to act, by at least 350 msec. That indicated that the volitional process is initiated unconsciously. Velmans uses the term preconscious instead of unconscious. But, in fact, subjects have no reportable awareness or intuitive feeling that the brain has started a process before their conscious wish/urge to act appears. Unconscious initiation of the voluntary process appeared to mean that conscious free will could not actually 'tell' the brain to begin its preparation to carry out a voluntary act. (shrink)

Here, I explore a modernist aesthetics of death metal. First, I briefly describe a few themes that characterize some modern art, without any claim that they are necessary, sufficient, or exhaustive. The goal is to obtain a set of themes that might be set against similar themes characteristic of death metal. This is the task in the second half of the paper. In particular, I argue that (some) modernist art and death metal share themes centered on transgressively breaking with the (...) past, pursue their conception of the truth, eliminate elements in their art form to purity them, and attack the art/non-art or music/non-music distinction. I contend that centering on death metal vocals reflects these themes. Death metal growls, like some modernist art, transgresses on past vocal traditions, tells us important truths, eliminates traditional concepts/techniques of signing, and undermines the singing/noise distinction. (shrink)

Sensation elicited by a skin stimulus was subjectively reported to feel stronger when followed by a stimulus to somatosensory cerebral cortex , even when C was delayed by up to 400 ms or more. This expands the potentiality for retroactive effects beyond that previously known as backward masking. It also demonstrates that the content of a sensory experience can be altered by another cerebral input introduced after the sensory signal arrives at the cortex. The long effective S-C intervals support the (...) thesis that a duration of cortical activity of up to 0.5 s is required before awareness of a sensory stimulus is developed. (shrink)

Ichikawa and Jarvis offer a new rationalist theory of mental content and defend a traditional epistemology of philosophy. They argue that philosophical inquiry is continuous with non-philosophical inquiry, and can be genuinely a priori, and that intuitions do not play an important role in mental content or the a priori.

This paper is ambitious: it begins with mixing externalism in philosophy of mind with internalism in epistemology, and it ends with instructive insights from social and feminist thought. In the first stage, I argue that one can consistently combine two theses that appear, at first glance, incompatible: cognitive externalism—the thesis that one’s mental states/processing can extend past one’s biological boundaries—and mentalism in epistemology—i.e., that epistemic justification supervenes on one’s mental states. This yields the perhaps startling or strange view that the (...) loci of epistemic justification are both mental states and located externally to one’s skull and skin. This motivates the second stage: I aim to ease that strangeness by suggesting that most discussions of cognitive externalism and epistemology too often focus exclusively on extending epistemically reliable abilities, faculties, dispositions, etc. to artifacts in one’s environment. Instead, we should think of this combination as informed by feminist epistemologists’ insistence of our thinking’s irreducible and radical sociality. Epistemic communities shape and are shaped by our cognition—echoing the dynamic, interactive integration at the heart of cognitive externalism. Thus, just as I am part of an epistemic community, it is also a part of me. Thus, I think with others: not merely as an artifact but as constituent elements of my cognition itself; resulting in a robust socially extended internalism. (shrink)

By the middle of the eighteenth century the new science had challenged the intellectual primacy of common experience in favor of recondite, expert and even counter-intuitive knowledge increasingly mediated by specialized instruments. Meanwhile modern philosophy had also problematized the perceptions of common experience — in the case of David Hume this included our perception of causal relations in nature, a fundamental precondition of scientific endeavor.In this article I argue that, in responding to the ‘problem of induction’ as advanced by Hume, (...) Reid reformulated Aristotelian foundationalism in distinctly modern terms. An educator and mathematician self-consciously working within the framework of the new science, Reid articulated a philosophical foundation for natural knowledge anchored in the human constitution and in processes of adjudication in an emerging modern public sphere of enlightened discourse. Reid thereby transformed one of the bases of Aristotelian science — common experience — into a philosophically and socially justified notion of ‘common sense’. Reid's intellectual concerns had as much to do with the philosophy of science as they did with moral philosophy or epistemology proper, and were bound up with wider social and scientific changes taking place in the early modern period. (shrink)

In an age when it has become fashionable to dismiss the Enlightenment as a sinister movement based on instrumental rationality, Benjamin Redekop delves deeper to understand the movement on its own terms. In Enlightenment and Community he shows that the E.

Recent approaches to the social epistemology of belief formation have appealed to an epidemiological model, on which the mechanisms explaining how we form beliefs from our society or community along the lines of infectious disease. More specifically, Alvin Goldman (2001) proposes an etiology of (social) belief along the lines of an epistemological epidemiology. On this “contagion model,” beliefs are construed as diseases that infect people via some socio-epistemic community. This paper reconsiders Goldman’s epidemiological approach in terms of epistemic trust. By (...) focusing on beliefs as diseases, Goldman misconstrues and underestimates the central role that epistemic trust plays in their formation (maintenance, revision, etc.). I suggest that we put trust, accordingly, as the center of an epidemiological model of social doxology—epistemic trust, rather than beliefs, is the disease with which one is infected. So, contra Goldman, beliefs themselves aren’t the disease—they are symptoms. Trust, on this approach, can be viewed as a pathology. This point connects Annette Baier’s (1994) work on moral trust—taking a cue from her “pathologies of trust.” The real pathology centered in social doxology is the epistemic trust manifested by those beliefs. Accordingly, I shall explore (and tentatively defend) an epidemiological model for such “pathological” epistemic trust inspired by Baier’s work on moral trust, one which can more adequately account for the infectious epistemic trust at work in social belief formation. (shrink)

Luke in the preface of his Gospel says that he is going to write ‘in an orderly account’ (Lk 1:3). However, scholars have no consensus about the kind of order Luke is seeking. Many believe that Luke writes as a historian. Because Greco-Roman historians seem to have a practice to indicate in their prefaces the writing methodologies of their writings, this article aims to ascertain Luke’s writing order through a comparison of Luke’s two prefaces with those in the writings of (...) the Greco-Roman historians. This article proposes that Luke most likely adopts the common writing methodologies of the Greco-Roman historians and writes in chronological order. (shrink)

Patrick Grim and Einar Duenger Bohn have recently argued that there can be no perfectly knowing Being. In particular, they urge that the object of omniscience is logically absurd (Grim) or requires an impossible maximal point of all knowledge (Bohn). I argue that, given a more classical notion of omniscience found in Aquinas and Augustine, we can shift the focus of perfect knowledge from what that being must know to the mode of that being’s understanding. Since Grim and Bohn focus (...) on the object rather than mode of God’s knowledge, this classical approach to omniscience undermines their objections. (shrink)